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There has been growing concern in recent years that patents confer too
much power in the context of standard setting organizations (“SSOs”),
creating a “hold-up problem” for implementers. Those concerned often
urge antitrust enforcers to intervene or claim SSOs should establish patent
policies that better protect implementers. This Article explains why these
concerns undermine incentives to innovate and proposes a “New
Madison” approach for the application of antitrust law to intellectual
property rights. The New Madison approach, inspired by the writings of
James Madison in the Founding Era, has four basic premises: (1) patent
hold-up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and therefore antitrust
law should not be used as a tool to police contractual commitments patent
holders make to SSOs; (2) SSOs should not become vehicles for
implementers to skew conditions in their favor when incorporating a
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patented technology; (3) SSOs and courts should have a very high burden
before adopting rules that severely restrict the right of patent holders to
exclude or—even worse—adopting rules that amount to a de facto
compulsory licensing scheme; (4) a unilateral and unconditional refusal
to license a patent should be considered per se legal from the perspective
of the antitrust laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Many in the patent community champion Thomas Jefferson as the
father of patent law. 1 President Jefferson’s contributions and public
influence in this area cannot be understated, as he was the first lead
patent examiner in the United States,2 and his writings on patent policy
were influential in the early years of the Republic. But, lately, it has
been vogue among some critics of the U.S. patent system to selectively

1
The Supreme Court in the mid-Twentieth Century was a primary mover in this regard.
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966). See generally Adam Mossoff,
Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 961 (2007) (explaining that the
Court’s “lengthy and numerous quotations from Jefferson’s writings established his views as the
historical policy foundation for American patent law”).
2
Jefferson served this role in his capacity as Secretary of State. The Patent Act of 1790 gave
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General together the duty to
consider patent applications, and any two of these officials could grant a patent. The Patent Act
of 1793 changed course and created a registration-based (rather than examination-based) system.
See Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), aff’d and remanded, 566
U.S. 431 (2012).
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quote Jefferson to make the case that intellectual property rights ought
to be reined in.3
I submit that the true father of U.S. patent law was the Founding
Father principally responsible for drafting the Constitution, James
Madison.
Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers that “[t]he copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law,” and that “[t]he right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors.” 4 Madison went on to note a
policy rationale for patent rights, stating that “the public good fully
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.” 5 Analogizing patent rights
to common law rights was a truly revolutionary position. In Great
Britain, patents were conferred on an arbitrary basis by the King or
Queen to political and economic allies, often with little regard for the
utility of the invention. 6
The notion that “rights” should belong to inventors and that this right
“coincides” with “the public good” was not widely shared at the
time.7 Indeed, Benjamin Franklin, the famous inventor, intellectual, and
founder of the University of Pennsylvania, took a more magnanimous
approach. He wrote in his autobiography that he did not oppose the use
of his inventions without compensation, as he had “no desire of profiting
from patents himself, and hat[ed] disputes.” 8
The exchanges between Jefferson and Madison on the question of
patent rights in 1788 are therefore illuminating of Madison’s intellectual
influence. Reflecting the general anti-monopoly sentiment at the time,
Jefferson wrote from his post in Paris that “the benefit even of limited

3
See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 1, at 962 n.42, 963-64 & n.46 (citing examples); Eric E.
Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV.
1935, 1941 (2014).
4
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5
Id.
6
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (noting “the power often exercised
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English Crown . . . . granting monopolies to
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public”); Tyler
T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 912-18 (2002). One of the more (in)famous instances was
The Case of Monopolies, which condemned an “odious monopoly” in playing cards granted by
Queen Elizabeth. 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 (K.B. 1603).
7
See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 6, at 926 (“Jefferson’s concerns were widely shared by
others at the time.”).
8
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 124 (John
Bigelow ed., Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1906) (1791).
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monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general
suppression.”9
In response, Madison acknowledged that monopolies “are justly
classed among the greatest nuisances in Government.” 10 But he
recognized a limited exception for patents. “[I]s it clear,” he asked
Jefferson, “that as encouragement to literary works and ingenious
discoveries, [monopolies] are not too valuable to be wholly
renounced?”11 Madison answered his own question, demonstrating a
nuanced understanding of how to balance concerns about monopolies
with creating incentives to innovate: “Monopolies are sacrifices of the
many to the few. . . . Where the power . . . is in the many not in the few,
the danger can not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is
much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed
to the many.”12
Madison understood that replacing monarchy with democracy
reversed the threat of the misapplication of power, creating a risk that
patent holders might suffer from the tyranny of the majority seeking to
benefit unfairly from their innovation.
Madison’s view ultimately prevailed in the text of the Constitution,
tying the right to a patent to innovation, or “the progress of science and
useful arts.”13
Remarkably, the word “right” appears only once in the original
Constitution—which took effect two years before the Bill of Rights was
ratified—in the Copyright and Patent Clause. The reward of a patent for
a fixed period aligned the interests of inventors, who need incentives to
innovate, with the interests of the public, who want the fruits of
innovation. It was an ingenious compromise that unleashed the power
of innovation in the young Republic.

9
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, July 31, 1788, available at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0147.
10
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, available at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0218 [hereinafter “Oct. 17, 1788
Madison Letter”].
11
Id.
12
Id. Though both Jefferson and Madison conceptualized patents as conferring
“monopolies,” that is not presumptively true from the perspective of the antitrust laws. See
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 2.2 (2017) (“The Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret
necessarily confers market power upon its owner. . . . If an intellectual property right does confer
market power, that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws.”).
13
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8.
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This history would not be complete without noting that, in the end,
Thomas Jefferson shifted his perspective on patents to embrace a more
Madisonian position. He wrote Madison in 1789 that he would support
an article in the Bill of Rights specifying that “[m]onopolies may be
allowed to persons for their own productions in literature and their own
inventions in the arts” for a fixed term. 14 Jefferson went on to become
the administrator of the patent system under the 1790 Patent Act, and
authored the subsequent 1793 Patent Act. 15 In his writings, Jefferson
voiced his support for patent protection for invention on the ground that
“ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.” 16
In recent months I have found inspiration in this history and
Madison’s dogged perseverance in favor of strong patent protections—
a view that stood at odds with much of the received wisdom and practice
of the day.
There has been a shift in recent years toward what I would call a
“retro-Jefferson” view of patents as conferring too much power that
ought to be curbed, either through reinterpreting antitrust law or
establishing patent policies of standard setting organizations (“SSO”) in
order to favor implementers who practice on a patent when they build
new technologies. Many advocates of reducing the power of intellectual
property rights cite the so-called “hold-up” problem in the context of
SSOs. As many of you know, I believe these concerns are largely
misplaced.17 Instead, I favor what I call the “New Madison” approach
to the application of antitrust law to intellectual property rights.
The New Madison approach, if I may, has four basic premises that
are aimed at ensuring that patent holders have adequate incentives to
innovate and create exciting new technologies, and that licensees have
appropriate incentives to implement those technologies.
First, hold-up is fundamentally not an antitrust problem, and
therefore antitrust law should not be used as a tool to police FRAND
commitments that patent holders make to standard setting organizations.
Second, standard setting organizations should not become vehicles
for concerted actions by market participants to skew conditions for
patented technologies’ incorporation into a standard in favor of
14
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Aug. 28, 1789, available at
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0354.
15
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
16
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans, May 2, 1807, available at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-5538.
17
See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General – Antitrust Division, “Take It To
the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law” (Nov. 10,
2017), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download.
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implementers because this can reduce incentives to innovate and
encourage patent hold-out.
Third, because a key feature of patent rights is the right to exclude,
standard setting organizations and courts should have a very high
burden before they adopt rules that severely restrict that right or—even
worse—adopt rules that amount to a de facto compulsory licensing
scheme.
Fourth, consistent with the fundamental right to exclude, from the
perspective of the antitrust laws, a unilateral and unconditional refusal
to license a patent should be considered per se legal.
I. PATENT HOLD-UP IS NOT AN ANTITRUST PROBLEM
To understand what I mean when I say that patent hold-up is not an
antitrust problem, it is important to step back to consider the purpose of
antitrust law—what it does, and what it should not do. At its core,
antitrust law aims to protect competition and consumers. 18
Antitrust law is guided by a consumer welfare standard, which dates
back to the origins of the Sherman Act. 19 The ultimate focus on the
consumer gained prominence in the late 1970s and 1980s through the
intellectual leadership of Judge Robert Bork, 20 Judge Frank
Easterbrook,21 and others.22 This standard sharpens the focus of antitrust
18
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.27 (1984); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition
as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality,
and the greatest material progress . . . . But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.”).
19
See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978) (“The Sherman Act was clearly
presented and debated as a consumer welfare prescription.”); Charles S. Dameron, Note, Present
at Antitrust’s Creation: Consumer Welfare in the Sherman Act’s State Statutory Forerunners,
125 YALE L.J. 1072, 1078 (2016) (explaining that the Sherman Act’s state predecessors were
designed to promote what we now call consumer welfare, and that “[t]he federal courts’ current
focus on consumer welfare should be understood not as a modern contrivance, but as a faithful
application of the Sherman Act as it was written”).
20
BORK, supra note 19, at 66.
21
Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1698 (1986)
(explaining that doubts expressed by “Chicago School” antitrust scholars about earlier models
of antitrust policy “coupled with data backing up many of their claims, have coincided with a
change in the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence that emphasizes efficiency and
consumers’ welfare”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18
(1984) (explaining that the antitrust plaintiff “should be required to demonstrate that the
defendant's practices are capable of enriching the defendant by harming consumers”).
22
E.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); see William E. Kovacic, The
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scrutiny to anticompetitive practices that are harmful to consumers,
rather than competitors, so that the antitrust laws are not misapplied to
advance social goals unrelated to consumer welfare and efficiency.
Importantly, however, the consumer welfare standard is not
synonymous with a policy always favoring lower prices. 23 For example,
high demand for an exciting new product may drive up its price, but that
price increase may simply reflect consumer preference for a superior
product relative to alternatives. 24 Antitrust law is intended to protect this
behavior, not punish it, so that others will have incentives to innovate
and compete themselves, all for the benefit of consumers. 25 Such
dynamic competition should be encouraged by our enforcement
policies.
Rather than focusing on prices in isolation, antitrust law instead
protects consumers where practices also harm competition—that is, they
harm some “competitive process” in a manner that causes harm to
consumers in the form of above-competitive prices, lower output, or
reduced efficiency.26 Indeed, directly showing harm to end-consumers
Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy,
36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1444 (1990) (explaining that Areeda and Turner “proposed an average
variable cost pricing test” that “made courts and enforcement agencies far more skeptical of
predatory pricing allegations”).
23
I note that Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen has thoughtfully expressed a similar point in
criticizing the application of antitrust law to FRAND disputes. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
“What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Antitrust?” at 3 (Sept. 22, 2016), available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/985823/concurrence_dinner_sp
eech_092216.pdf (“Simply condemning a high price, a refusal to deal, or the use of a SEP
without showing harm to supply- and demand-side limits on market power, however, is not
antitrust. It is regulatory action meant to reengineer market outcomes to reflect enforcers’
preferences.”).
24
See Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“Competitive markets are characterized by both price and quality competition, and a firm’s
comparatively high price may simply reflect a superior product.”); Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (“Generally you
must pay more for higher quality.”).
25
See, e.g., Verizon Comm’cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (noting that “charging of monopoly prices . . . is an important element of the freemarket system”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION,
AND COMPETITIVENESS 119, 122-23 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (“An
antitrust policy that reduced prices by 5 percent today at the expense of reducing by 1 percent
the annual rate at which innovation lowers the cost of production would be a calamity.”).
26
See NYNEX Corp. v. Dicson, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1998) (explaining that higher
telephone rates from consumers did not flow “from a less competitive market,” but from lawfully
acquired market power, and that the plaintiff had to “allege and prove harm . . . to the competitive
process, i.e., to competition itself”); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (“The purpose of antitrust law, at least as articulated in the modern cases,
is to protect the competitive process as a means of promoting economic efficiency.”).
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is not always necessary to prove a violation of the antitrust laws. For
example, collusion among buyers to push input prices down—what
economists call a monopsony effect—may violate the antitrust laws
because there is harm to competition even though it results in lower
prices.27
This is where theories that unilateral patent hold-up is an antitrust
problem go wrong. Stating that a patent holder can derive higher
licensing fees through hold-up simply reflects basic commercial reality.
Condemning this practice, in isolation, as an antitrust violation, while
ignoring equal incentives of implementers to “hold out,” risks creating
“false positive” errors of over-enforcement that would discourage
valuable innovation.
Advocates of using antitrust law to reduce the supposed risk of
patent hold-up fail to identify an actual harm to the competitive process
that warrants intervention. If an inventor participates in a standardsetting process and wins support for including a patented technology in
a standard, that decision does not magically transform a lawful patent
right into an unlawful monopoly. To be sure, that decision gives the
patent holder some bargaining power in claiming a piece of the surplus
created by standardization. And, it would require the patent holder to
live up to commitments they bargained for, which are enforceable by
contract laws. But standard setting decisions are intended to be a
recognition that a technology is superior to its alternatives. A favorable
SSO decision, like a patent itself, is a reward for an innovator’s
meritorious contribution whose wide-ranging benefits can ripple
throughout the economy, contributing to dynamic competition.
Arguments that inclusion in a standard confers market power that could
harm competition typically rest on the unreasonable assumption that the
winning technology is no better than its rivals. 28
It is therefore unsurprising that proponents of using antitrust law to
police FRAND commitments principally rely on models devoid of
economic or empirical evidence that hold-up is a real phenomenon, 29
27
See Vogel v. Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.)
(“[B]uyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices that suppliers charge the members of
the cartel below the competitive level, are illegal per se. Just as a seller’s cartel enables the
charging of monopoly prices, a buyer’s cartel enables the charging of monopsony prices.”).
28
See Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory, 13
J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1, 36-41 (2017).
29
Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for ‘Patent Holdout’ Threaten
to Dismantle FRAND, and Why it Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1388 (2018)
(“[D]etailed empirical studies . . . have all come to the same conclusion: theoretical concerns
regarding patent holdup and royalty stacking have not borne out in industries subject to
innovation-driven standardization, such as mobile handsets, where the evidence points to the
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much less one that harms competition. Since hold-up theories gained
traction in the early 2000s, it is striking that they still remain an
empirical enigma in the academic literature. 30 Antitrust law demands
evidence-based enforcement, without which there is a real threat of
undermining incentives to innovate.
That is why I believe so strongly that antitrust law should play no
role in policing unilateral FRAND commitments where contract or
common law remedies would be adequate. 31 I worry that courts and
enforcers have overly indulged theories of patent hold-up as a supposed
competition problem,32 while losing sight of the basic policies of
antitrust law. They lose sight of the fact that antitrust law is not just
remedial; it is, importantly, intended to deter through the threat of treble
damages.33 As enforcers, we have a responsibility to ensure that antitrust
policy remains sound, so that U.S. consumers continue to enjoy the
benefits of dynamic competition and innovation, and so we do not
export unsound theories of antitrust liability abroad, where
economically dubious enforcement actions can have serious, harmful
effects on U.S. businesses, consumers, and workers.

sharp lowering of prices continuous innovation, low aggregate patent royalty payments, and
increasing market penetration.”).
30
See Galetovic & Haber, supra note 28, at 9 (“At the same time that there are self-evident
stelae contradicting patent-holdup theory, there is no positive evidence in support of its core
predictions.”); Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence:
Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, OECD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
STANDARD
SETTING,
at
7
(Nov.
18,
2014),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%2
82014%2984&doclanguage=en (“Despite the 15 years proponents of the theories have had to
amass evidence, the empirical studies conducted thus far have not shown that holdup or royalty
stacking is a common problem in practice.”).
31
Delrahim, supra note 17, at 7-9; see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin &
Joshua D. Wright, The Troubling Use of Antitrust To Regulate FRAND Licensing, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, at 6-7 (2015).
32
E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, “Policy Statement on
Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments” (Jan.
8,
2013),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/09/18/290994.pdf
[hereinafter
“DOJ-PTO Joint Policy Statement”]; see Layne-Farrar, supra note 30, at 4 (noting that “several
competition agencies have weighed in either directly or indirectly” on theories of patent holdup, and “[t]aking their cue from the[se] debates . . . manufacturers implementing standards
moved patent holdup and royalty stacking arguments into court filings, complaints at
competition agencies, and proposals to change standard setting rules”).
33
15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
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II. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BETTER PROTECT
AGAINST HOLD-OUT TO ENSURE MAXIMUM INCENTIVES TO
INNOVATE
The second premise of the New Madison approach I advocate is that
standard setting organizations, as collective bodies, themselves should
avoid over-indulging theories of patent hold-up, to the detriment of
patent rights. SSOs should instead strive to ensure that their patent
policies create maximum incentives for innovators to invent (or at a
minimum don’t curtail incentives to innovate), and for licensees to
implement.34
Achieving this goal is not an easy task. At minimum, it requires a
recognition that implementer hold-out poses a more serious threat to
innovation than innovator hold-up. To be sure, both practices threaten
to undermine innovation through under-investment in new technology.
But, there is an asymmetry between the two: innovators must make
significant upfront investments in technology before they know whether
the investments will pay off, whereas implementers can delay at least
some of their investments in a technology until after royalty rates have
been determined.35
To the extent antitrust law should play a role, it is to ensure that
concerted action among implementers or innovators does not occur at
any level of the supply chain. Specifically, as I noted this past Fall, the
Antitrust Division will be skeptical of rules that SSOs impose that
appear designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage from IP
creators to implementers, or vice versa. 36 What do I mean by that? As
enforcers, we have only limited insight into the patent policies of
various standard-setting organizations, and we do not seek to impose a
top-down mandate to skew the playing field clearly in the direction of
innovators or implementers. But we expect there to be some symmetry
between these competing interests, which manifests itself in two ways.
First, at SSOs, we hope to see a diversity of views represented on
patent policy committees to give us confidence that patent policies are
based on reasoned and unbiased decision-making. We strongly
34
To be sure, innovation occurs at different levels of the supply chain in most industries,
with patent holders and implementers each adding value that ultimately benefits consumers. I
encourage SSOs to adopt patent policies that ensure that there are appropriate incentives for
innovation at every level.
35
Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Innovators, Implementers, and Two-Sided Hold-Up,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, August 2015, at 2-3; Bernhard Ganglmair, Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J.
Werden, Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation,
60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249, 260-61 (2012); Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 17.
36
Delrahim, supra note 17, at 11.
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encourage SSOs to avoid allowing voting blocks of competitors to
dominate decisions on patent policy or on which technology to
incorporate into a standard. That kind of action would confirm the
Supreme Court’s observation that SSOs “can be rife with opportunities
for anticompetitive activity.” 37 Ensuring that no voting blocks take hold
would help negate the risk that a rule or standard is the product of a
buyer’s or seller’s cartel. As long as an SSO’s IP policies are the product
of a consensus or a clear majority that includes both standard-essential
patent holders and implementers, the Department of Justice should have
no reason for concern. On the other hand, if an SSO’s policymaking
decisions appear to be dominated by implementers, and the resulting
policies or standards appear to be heavily skewed toward implementers
and away from innovators, that’s already two strikes. 38
Second, I believe innovation policy would benefit from a diversity
of patent policies across standard setting organizations. Optimally,
competition can begin to emerge among SSOs within the same industry,
with dueling patent policies that allow for the more efficient regime to
prevail. Across industries, we expect that patent policies and the
requirements for the inclusion of patented technology in a standard will
vary depending on the technology in question. By contrast, I worry that
advocacy by government agencies in recent years could lead SSOs to
adopt a uniform approach to articulating specific commitments
necessary for inclusion in a standard—an approach that may be skewed
too far in the direction of implementers. This unfortunate trend should
not continue.
III. PATENT HOLDER INJUNCTION RIGHTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED,
NOT PERSECUTED
The third premise of the New Madison approach to antitrust law and
intellectual property is to respect the core of what it means to hold an IP
right—namely, the right to exclude.39 In his letters to Thomas Jefferson,
37
Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982); see also
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988) (“There is no doubt
that the members of such [standard setting] associations often have economic incentives to
restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious
potential for anticompetitive harm. . . . Accordingly, private standard-setting associations have
traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny.”).
38
The same would be true if an SSO’s policymaking decisions appear to be dominated by
IP holders and the resulting standards appear heavily skewed in their favor.
39
35 U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
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Madison acknowledged that state-conferred monopolies are “among the
greatest nuisances in government,”40 but maintained that these “nuisances”
could be harnessed to serve the greater good of social progress and
innovation through patent protection. His analogy of patents to the
“common law . . . copyright of authors” in The Federalist Papers41 is
telling because, at the time, the copyright of authors was understood as a
property right.42 Equipping patent holders with the property right to
exclude therefore goes hand-in-hand with the goals Madison envisioned
for the U.S. patent regime.
Understanding patent rights, once conferred, as a form of property right
helps frame the current debate over injunctions, and demonstrates how far
we’ve strayed off course.43 Under current Federal Circuit law, a standardessential patent holder faces significant difficulty in establishing a right to
an injunction instead of damages.44 In a worrisome trend, some
commentators have suggested that the mere act of seeking an injunction
order to prevent infringement raises competition concerns,45 and, with a
degree of hubris, litigants have advanced such theories as a basis for
antitrust liability.46 Taken together, these trends fundamentally transform
the nature of patent rights away from their constitutional underpinnings.
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still
Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 109 (1990) (“Patents give a right to exclude, just as
the law of trespass does with real property.”).
40
Oct. 17, 1788 Madison Letter, supra note 10.
41
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 4.
42
See Mossoff, supra note 1, at 982 (explaining that Blackstone in Great Britain and
Chancellor Kent in America conceptualized copyright as a right of property).
43
See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2667 (1994) (“Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to exclude
granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have, and
would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and technological
research.” (quoting Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
44
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing decision
finding that commitment to license on FRAND terms strips patent holder of right to seek
injunction, but finding that such a commitment “strongly suggest[s]” that damages for
infringement should be adequate).
45
See, e.g., Greg Sivinski, Patently Obvious: Why Seeking Injunctions on StandardEssential Patents Subject to a FRAND Commitment Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
COMPETITION
POL’Y
INT’L,
Oct.
2013,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/SivinskiOct-2.pdf; cf. DOJPTO Joint Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 6 (asserting that an injunction order against
infringement of a FRAND-encumbered patent “may harm competition and consumers by
degrading one of the tools SDOs employ to mitigate the threat of such opportunistic actions by
the holders of F/RAND-encumbered patents that are essential to their standards”).
46
See, e.g., Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-723-RGA, 2016 WL 1464545,
at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016); Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims, Huawei Techs.
Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00052-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 8470351 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6,
2016).
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They convert a property rule into a liability rule,47 and amount to a
troubling de facto compulsory licensing scheme.48
It is not difficult to understand why that is the case, particularly in the
context of standard setting. If a patent holder effectively loses its right to
an injunction whenever a licensing dispute arises, or is deterred from
seeking an injunction due to the prospect of treble damages, an
implementer can freely infringe, knowing that the most he or she will
eventually have to pay is a reasonable royalty rate.49 Implementers have a
strong incentive to pursue this course while holding out from accepting a
license due to the high injunction bar for innovators that make FRAND
commitments.50 It is a harmful arbitrage that should be discouraged.
Some may be skeptical of this claim, given that “willful” infringement
entitles a patent holder to compensation up to treble damages.51 But it is
extremely difficult to prove willfulness, a demanding standard that the
Supreme Court emphasizes should be limited “to egregious cases of
misconduct.”52 Under recent developments of the law, the standard for
obtaining an injunction and the standard for proving willfulness both work
to the benefit of implementers and significantly limit the downside risk of
infringement. This results in a de facto compulsory licensing scheme for
FRAND-encumbered patents deemed “standard essential,” and could
serve as a disincentive for innovation or for patent holders to contribute
technology to the standard-setting process in the first place. Deterring the
47

See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 20-21; Merges, supra note 43, at 2664-67.
See Anne Layne-Farrar, Business Models and the Standard Setting Process, in THE PROS
AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 34, 48 (Konkurrensverket 2010) (“Once upstream patent
holders have no option of seeking injunctive relief, they will have no bargaining power at all in
licensing negotiations. Especially within standard setting contexts, where the parties typically
commit to license via a FRAND promise, such a rule would amount to compulsory licensing,
leaving upstream patent holders at the mercy of licensees.”). Some commentators have argued
that such a scheme could lead to “an eventual breakdown of the FRAND-enabled innovation
marketplace.” Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 15.
49
See id. at 17. As one commentator has noted, this free-riding effect is particularly
pernicious because patent holders cannot assert an entire portfolio of infringed patents at the
same time. See Anne Layne-Farrar, Why Patent Holdout Is Not Just a Fancy Name for Plain
Old Patent Infringement, CPI NORTH AMERICA COLUMN, at 2 (2016) (“[E]ven if the SEP holder
prevails in a given infringement action, standard implementers can (and typically do) proclaim
that they are only obligated to take a license to the specifically adjudicated patents, which have
been proven to be valid and infringed.”).
50
See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions:
The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek
Injunctions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, at 4 (2014) (“[W]e have not found even one injunction or
exclusion order that actually kept a product off the shelf because it infringed a SEP.”); LayneFarrar, supra note 30, at 6 (“While an injunction is a strong penalty, these have rarely ever been
granted for SEP infringements.”).
51
See 35 U.S.C. § 284; Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
52
Id. at 1935.
48
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right to enjoin other parties from infringement—particularly
competitors—seriously reduces incentives to innovate, much in the same
way that the DOJ’s enforcement policies in the 1970s prevented field of
use restrictions in patent licensing. This can cause great harm to
consumers,53 and is particularly problematic as more and more products
and services come to depend on standardized technology.
IV. A UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL REFUSAL TO LICENSE A
VALID PATENT SHOULD BE PER SE LEGAL
The foregoing analysis leads me to the fourth premise of the “New
Madison” approach, which is that a unilateral and unconditional refusal to
license a valid patent should be per se legal.54 A refusal to license should
not be a source from which a competitor or customer may seek treble
damages under the Sherman Act. That is because competition and
consumers both benefit when inventors have full incentives to exploit their
patent rights. This requires an assurance to inventors that they need not
subsidize their competitors’ business models if they prefer not to do so.
The Supreme Court clarified as much in Trinko, explaining that a refusal
to deal is not an antitrust violation if the parties have never done business
with each other, because “there is no duty to aid competitors.”55 A de facto
compulsory licensing scheme turns this policy underlying the Sherman
Act on its head.
To that end, I urge scholars and policymakers to give careful
consideration to the underlying policies of the Trinko decision. The
Supreme Court emphasized that its earlier Aspen Skiing decision was
merely a “limited exception” to the rule that there is no duty to deal under
the antitrust laws.56 But some, particularly some of the newer enforcement
agencies abroad, may think the “exception” leaves room for a licensee to
bring an antitrust suit if a patent holder terminates or refuses to renew the
licensing agreement.57 The licensor thus could be forced to litigate for

53
See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 29, at 17, 21 (“[I]n the face of high transaction costs,
pure liability rules tend both to encourage ‘patent holdout’ and to shortchange innovators in ex
post allocations of the cooperative surplus created by FRAND negotiations.”).
54
Delrahim, supra note 17, at 8; see Ginsburg et al., supra note 50, at 5 (explaining that
explaining that an antitrust remedy for seeking an injunction “would be harmful” to consumer
welfare and that “[o]verdeterring SEP holders from seeking an injunction effectively diminishes
the value of their patents and hence their incentive to innovate”).
55
Verizon Comm’cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
56
Id. at 409 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985)).
57
Id.
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years the consequences of a business decision stemming from changed
competitive dynamics or a new licensing strategy. Antitrust laws should
not be used to transform an inventor’s one-time decision to offer a license
to a competitor into a forever commitment that the inventor will continue
licensing that competitor in perpetuity.
CONCLUSION
This past Fall, I urged all of us who care about innovation to consider
“fresh thinking” about the implications of SSOs and the proper role of
antitrust.58 So far, I have been encouraged and humbled by the positive
response. To look forward to the future of standard-essential patents,
however, we should take a moment to look back to the wisdom of the
Founding Fathers, and the vision of James Madison in particular. He
understood the value of strong IP protection as a means of fueling
innovation and technological progress. I submit that a “New Madison”
approach to these issues may help restore the promise of patent and
antitrust law, and unleash America’s full potential for innovation. We
should, in the words of Madison, continue to recognize that “as
encouragement to . . . ingenious discoveries,” patent rights are “too
valuable to renounce,” and that we should fear not that the many are
sacrificed to the few, but rather that “the few will be unnecessarily
sacrificed to the many.”59

58
59

Id. at 14.
Oct. 17, 1788 Madison Letter, supra note 10.

